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INTRODUCTION
Modern class action litigation began in 1966, when the Federal Civil Rules
Advisory Committee completed a revolutionary set of revisions to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fifteen years of tumult followed, as the
legal community struggled to test the new device’s potential and identify its
limits. The class action’s waters then calmed, and by the end of the Reagan
Administration, some viewed the Rule 23 experiment as nearing its end.1 But
the turbulence started again before the 1980s finished, and heated combat
over class action law and policy has continued since then. The late 1980s and
early 1990s were therefore a crucial period. During these years the class action
moved onto the evolutionary course it continues to follow.
Several episodes triggered policymakers’ reengagement with class action law
during these years. But perhaps most consequential was the short but
supercharged life of the mass tort class action. I tell this story here, as an
installment in my series on the history of the modern class action.2 My focus is
the constellation of events that led to Amchem,3 the stunning class settlement
proposed in 1993 to resolve millions of asbestos-related claims. Although the
story of the mass tort class action has several important chapters, the Amchem one
is surely the first among equals, for the potential it had to remake the law of
complex litigation, and for its pervasive and lasting influence on class action
doctrine. Had Rule 23 proven able to encompass mass tort litigation, it would
have shown its mettle in Amchem. The settlement’s failure largely ended the mass
tort class action experiment, at least for two decades.4
The mass tort class action’s story has abundant intrinsic interest, but it is
worth telling for other reasons as well. First, its short life began and ended at
a key moment in litigation history. The modern class action debuted during an
era when the institutional footprint of private civil litigation expanded
considerably.5 This development sparked a reaction, as critics faulted with
1 Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1988, at B7
(noting that the number of class actions swelled in the 1970s but had fallen since then); Nicholas C.
McBride, Class-Action Suit Out of Fashion in Today’s Law Cases. Court Rulings Make Lawsuits Filed by
Group Less Attractive, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 4, 1988, at 19 (discussing a decline in class
action filings from the 1970s to the 1980s).
2 See generally David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation and
Legitimacy, 1981-1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); David Marcus, The History of the
Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013)
[hereinafter Marcus, Sturm und Drang]; David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and
its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011).
3 The Amchem case went through several names, including Carlough and Georgine.
4 See infra text accompanying note 275 (discussing NFL Concussion litigation).
5 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 5–16 (2010) (observing that the rate of private litigation brought in federal
courts “exploded” in the late 1960s).
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increasing vehemence a perceived surfeit of judicial power exercised through
the supervision of litigation. By the early 1990s, class action law and policy had
become an important front in a larger war, fought over the right response to a
basic query—how much weight can private civil litigation legitimately bear?6
The failure of the mass tort class action, coinciding with other developments,
provided a more restrictive answer. Second, the episode has had a long afterlife,
one that has continued to influence the law of complex litigation. The mass tort
class action contributed significantly to an important shift in the governing
structure for the supervision of class action doctrine. This shift has ensured that
a restrictive legal regime regulates Rule 23’s administration.
Part I describes the origins of the mass tort class action in the pathbreaking decisions of two judicial mavericks in the early 1980s. Amchem’s
story comes in Part II. Part III documents the lasting influence the mass tort
episode has had on the governance of class action doctrine.
I. ORIGINS
A proper understanding of the origins of the mass tort class action
requires a simple conceptual distinction.7 From the earliest days of the
modern class action, judges and policymakers understood that Rule 23 might
have relevance for mass accident litigation, or the litigation of multiple claims
arising from a single, localized catastrophe like an airplane crash.8 The
possibility that Rule 23 would intersect with dispersed mass tort litigation—
the litigation of personal injury claims arising from the diffuse exposure to
injurious products or substances—seemed more remote. Even Rule 23’s most
ardent champions excluded it from their sense of the class action’s domain.
Only in the early 1980s, with decisions by two judicial mavericks, did the link
between the class action and dispersed mass tort litigation really emerge.
A. Early Reluctance
The use of aggregative techniques to manage dispersed mass tort
litigation only began in the early 1960s,9 making the class action’s relevance
hard to imagine. But the members of the Advisory Committee that authored
the 1966 rule certainly anticipated that mass accident litigators might attempt
6
7

I owe Bob Bone for this formulation.
See In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing between
two types of mass tort suits—those arising from a single accident, and those that are more diffuse).
8 See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 179 (1969) (suggesting that Rule
23 could prove useful for the management of mass accident litigation).
9 Paul D. Rheingold, MER/29: Looking Back at the First Mass Tort Drug Case, TRIAL, Aug. 2014,
at 26, 26. For a sense of the primitive procedural state of mass tort litigation in the early 1960s, see
generally Note, Consolidation in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1963).
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to use the new Rule 23.10 Concern that class actions might generate binding
judgments for a large group of accident victims helped to derail an effort to
revise Rule 23 in the early 1950s.11 When the revision process began in earnest
in the early 1960s, the specter of a collusively litigated mass accident class
action rigged to settle personal injury liability cheaply haunted the Advisory
Committee.12 The committee ultimately agreed that “a very exceptional mass
accident case could qualify” under Rule 23(b)(3), given class members’ rights
to opt out.13 Some members found the mass accident class action a less
discomfiting prospect.14 But the committee anticipated the use of other tools,
not Rule 23, for the aggregate management of personal injury claims.15
The judicial attitude toward Rule 23’s use for air crash cases and the like
remained tentative and unsettled throughout the 1970s.16 Choice of law
problems, the superiority of other mechanisms for case management, and the
interest of individual litigants in personal control of valuable claims created
obstacles to certification.17 When the Advisory Committee surveyed federal
10 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9-17
(1991) (describing the Committee members’ views).
11 When Charles Clark introduced his revised Rule 23 to the Advisory Committee at a meeting
in May 1953, the very first interruption came from Bill Moore, who wanted to know whether it could
be used to dragoon tort victims into a particular case. Transcript, Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 111 (May 18, 1953), http://www.uscourts.gov. Clark’s response was “probably
yes.” Id. Moore opposed the revamped Rule 23 for this reason. Transcript, Advisory Committee on
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 157-58 (Mar. 1955), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-523-55 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
12 See, e.g., John P. Frank, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules: Dissenting View of Committee
Member 2 (May 28, 1965), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No.
CI-7107-01 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (“The corruption potential of the binding spurious class action intimidates
me. These cases are terribly easy to rig—a bright child could do it. I would not hold out the bait.”).
13 Discussion of Responses to Memorandum of December 2, 1963 3 (Jan. 31, 1964), in RECORDS
OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-08 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
14 See, e.g., Transcript, Meeting of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee 13 (Oct. 31-Nov. 2,
1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7104-53
(Cong. Info. Serv.) (comments of Charles Alan Wright) (insisting that “the mass accident” class
action “doesn’t bother me a bit”).
15 Andrew Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action “Alternative”,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1715-17 (2017) (commenting on members’ expectations that the soon-to-be-passed
MDL statute, not Rule 23, would govern claim aggregation for mass torts).
16 See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 767 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing
contrasting views in relevant case law); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 397
(E.D. Va. 1975) (same).
17 For decisions denying class certification, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States
Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975); Marchesi v. E. Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 500, 501-02
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 84-85 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Daye
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Hobbs v. Ne.
Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970). For decisions granting class certification, see Coburn
v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977); Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Martima, S.A.,
70 F.R.D. 401, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 562 (S.D.
Fla. 1973); Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 629 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v.
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judges in 1977 and asked whether “Rule 23 is capable of disposing efficiently
of mass accident claims,” slightly more than half answered yes.18 In contrast,
federal judges uniformly refused to certify dispersed mass tort classes until
the very end of the 1970s.19
This disinclination reflected the distance between the realities of personal
injury litigation, on one hand, and the primary normative foundation for a
powerful class action device that those who favored class litigation laid during
Rule 23’s first era, on the other. To the new rule’s critics, class certification
and the approval of class settlements required judges to wield extraordinary,
arguably illegitimate, power. To find that common issues of law and fact
predominate over individual ones, judges had to adjust the substantive law,
to downplay individual legal and factual issues as marginally relevant to the
adjudication of the defendant’s liability, or to remake these issues into
common ones.20 To impose a class-wide judgment or approve a class-wide
settlement, judges wrested control over claims from their individual owners.21
Proponents of an aggressive, powerful Rule 23 defended what I have called
a “regulatory conception” of the device as a response to such concerns.22 By their
view, the class action’s primary objective was not individual compensation but
regulatory efficacy, or the successful alteration of defendants’ behavior through
the vindication of substantive liability regimes. A class action properly targeted
the aggregate effects of the defendant’s conduct as experienced by a group of
undifferentiated regulatory beneficiaries. Without aggregation, claims would lie
dormant, and regulatory regimes would go unenforced. For these reasons,
supporters argued, judges could rightly downplay conflicts of interest among
individual class members, overlook or deemphasize individual legal issues that
differed from one class member’s claim to the next, and soften due process
protections for class members. By stressing common issues over individual ones,

Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155, 157 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n,
48 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.R.I. 1969).
18 Responses to Rule 23 Questionnaire (May 12, 1977), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6509-32 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
19 For decisions denying class certification for dispersed classes, see Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
84 F.R.D. 230, 234 (D.S.C. 1979); Van Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., Civ. No. 78-642,
1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9501, at *54 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1979); Yandle v. PPG Industries, Inc., 65
F.R.D. 566, 571-72 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Harrigan v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 402, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
20 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class
Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 861–67 (1974) (describing
substantive law changes made to facilitate class certification); William Simon, Class Actions—Useful
Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 383-386 (1973) (arguing that courts change substantive
law to facilitate class certification).
21 See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1127 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Goldbold, J., concurring) (criticizing such actions in Title VII class actions).
22 The discussion in this paragraph is based on Marcus, Sturm und Drang, supra note 2, at 592-593.
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courts could facilitate class certification, enable aggregate adjudication, and
thereby ensure that the class action discharged its regulatory task.
Complaints about the illegitimate exercise of what amounted to law
reform power through the supervision of litigation rang more hollow when
cases really centered on defendants’ undifferentiated treatment of all class
members,23 or when class members’ claims had such marginal value that
possibly no class member cared about losing control over their rights to sue.24
But personal injury cases lacked these characteristics.25 An alleged tortfeasor’s
liability often depends in large measure on proof of individual causation, an
issue rarely amenable to aggregate adjudication.26 Even issues that seemed
common, like general causation, may not be so. Unlike other types of federal
class actions in the 1970s,27 mass tort litigation implicated multiple states’ tort
law and for that reason the prospect that different bodies of law would apply
to different class members’ claims. Also, tort victims often have valuable
claims, so concern about judicial usurpation of their individual control cannot
be dismissed as formalistic.28 Finally, the principal justification for the
regulatory conception, that regulatory efficacy requires the sort of claim
mobilization that only aggregation can generate, misfired for mass torts,
where claim value incentivized plenty of individual litigation.29
The class action figured importantly in a more general debate that raged in the
1970s about the legitimate size of litigation’s institutional footprint.30 What had
begun in the 1960s as a technocratic concern over rising caseloads morphed the next
decade into a darker narrative about a pathological “litigation explosion.”31 Critics
of American civil justice lamented that excessive litigiousness among
23 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 872 (8th Cir. 1978); Paddison v. Fidelity
Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
24 Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 944 (1975).
25 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 393 (1967).
26 Susan E. Silbersweig, Case Note, Payton v. Abbott Laboratories: An Analysis of the
Massachusetts DES Class Action Suit, 6 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 263 (1980) (quoting a 1977 decision
denying class certification in a dispersed mass tort case).
27 Decisions limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts meant that most
federal class actions litigated in the 1970s arose under federal law. Marcus, Sturm und Drang, supra
note 2, at 627-28.
28 See, e.g., Hobbs v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (acknowledging the
interests of claimants in litigating independently).
29 See, e.g., Daye v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(observing that a significant number of individual plaintiffs had already filed suit in a putative class action).
30 See A.E. Dick Howard, A Litigation Society?, WILSON Q., Summer 1981, at 98, 102; see also
The Chilling Impact of Litigation: Easier Access to the Courts Means Skyrocketing Costs and Interminable
Delays, BUS. WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 58, 63; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role].
31 Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 285, 292-93 (2002).
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Americans32 and judges’ inability to keep frivolous or trivial claims off their
dockets33 meant that courts attracted too many disputes.34 Relatedly,35 according
to critics, an “imperial judiciary” had emerged by the mid-1970s, illegitimately
claiming power over an ever-expanding array of social, political, and economic
problems that had previously remained the province of the political branches.36
Abram Chayes offered the most important response to these charges.37
He agreed with critics that “[i]n our received tradition, the lawsuit is a vehicle
for settling disputes between private parties about private rights.”38
Conceived thusly, “the process is party-initiated and party-controlled,” with
the judge a passive, neutral participant who acts only when the parties request
it.39 By the mid-1970s, however, litigation had evolved to include “sprawling
and amorphous” endeavors “about the operation of public policy.”40 Chayes
insisted that groups could and should make transformative changes to social
or economic orders through lawsuits, with remedies designed for behavior
and policy modification to benefit diffuse members of the public. Such
litigation does not stand apart from political or administrative processes but
functions as a different channel for the pursuit of the same ends.41 The specific
parties recede into the background, with the judge becoming “the dominant
figure in organizing and guiding the case.”42
Chayes articulated a version of the regulatory conception as his
understanding of the class action.43 Part of his defense of the surfeit of judicial
power that public law litigation entailed drew on the conception’s normative
foundation: the exercise of this power enabled the vindication of substantive
legal regimes that might otherwise go unenforced.44 Chayes included all types
of the 1970s-era class action as exemplars of public law litigation.45 But mass tort
litigation was not a species within his genus. To Chayes, the leading defender of
32
33
34
35
36

Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
See, e.g., Chilling Impact, supra note 30, at 63.
JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 5 (1981).
Id. at 4-7.
See Nathan Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, PUB. INT. Fall 1975, at 114-17 (describing
the trend of growing judicial power); see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL
POLICY 4 (1976) (discussing the expansion of judicial responsibility since the 1960s).
37 Chayes, Role, supra note 30.
38 Id. at 1282; see also Howard, supra note 30, at 102.
39 Chayes, Role, supra note 30, at 1283.
40 Id. at 1302.
41 Id. at 1304.
42 Id. at 1284.
43 Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-27 (1982) (characterizing the class action device as an instrument for
“reformist litigators” seeking to assert group interests).
44 Id. at 27; Chayes, Role, supra note 30, at 1314.
45 Chayes, Role, supra note 30, at 1284 (referencing employment discrimination, school
desegregation, and other class actions).
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litigation’s big footprint (and the judicial power it implied), personal injury cases
exemplified traditional, party-centered and party-controlled lawsuits.46
B. Two Judicial Mavericks
The first breach in the dam came in 1979, when a district judge certified
a class of Massachusetts women exposed to diethylstilbestrol (DES), to
litigate as a group a number of issues common to their increased risk of
cancer claims.47 This innovation proved short-lived. The judge decertified
the class when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the
availability of enterprise liability for those plaintiffs who could not identify
which specific company bore responsibility for their exposure.48 Other
courts refused to certify DES classes.49
The iconoclastic Spencer Williams,50 the next federal judge to certify a
dispersed mass tort class, pushed harder. Already a class action pioneer,51
Williams turned to Rule 23 to address the escalating litigation disaster
prompted by the 1972 recall of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine birth control
device.52 After spending nine weeks trying a single case,53 Williams in 1982
certified a mandatory, non–opt-out national class of all Dalkon Shield plaintiffs
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to litigate the issue of punitive damages.54 He also
certified a smaller, California-only class under Rule 23(b)(3) to litigate the issue
of the defendant’s liability.55 Ruling sua sponte, Williams made only cursory
predominance and superiority findings to support the (b)(3) certification, and
vague limited fund findings for the (b)(1)(B) portion.56 He clearly expected
that his decision would prompt the parties to enter a global settlement.57
46
47

Id. at 1283.
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 385 (D. Mass. 1979); In Camera, 5 CLASS ACTION
REP. 469, 469 (1978); Silbersweig, supra note 26, at 243-44.
48 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 100 F.R.D. 336, 338-39 (D. Mass. 1983).
49 See Mertens v. Abbott Laboratories, 99 F.R.D. 38, 42 (D.N.H. 1983); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 93 F.R.D. 875, 880 (D.S.D. 1982); Silbersweig, supra note 26, at 247 (describing one such
decision in Illinois).
50 For example, Judge Williams served as a class representative three times in suits against the federal
government seeking raises for federal judges. See Terry Carter, Bucking for a Raise, 84 A.B.A. J. 32 (1998).
51 See, e.g., In re Consolidated Pre-Trial Proceedings in Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88,
97 & n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (certifying a class in an innovative early securities fraud decision).
52 See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation:
A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 985 (1993) (describing the Dalkon Shield litigation).
53 In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (observing that any attempt to try the cases individually would “bankrupt” a court’s
calendar).
54 Id. at 897-98.
55 Id. at 902-03.
56 Id.
57 See Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 22 JUDGES J. 8, 11 (1983).
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Jack Weinstein soon followed Williams’s lead.58 Although Weinstein had
once denounced personal injury class actions as a form of “legalized
ambulance chasing,”59 he put this youthful “indiscretion” behind him in
1983.60 He certified a mandatory national class in the famous Agent Orange
litigation to litigate the defendants’ liability for punitive damages,61 and he
certified everything else, including the defendants’ liability, under Rule
23(b)(3).62 Whereas Williams’s predominance analysis was cursory,
Weinstein’s was fanciful. He infamously determined that a single “national
substantive rule” would govern class members’ claims, thereby dodging the
otherwise insuperable barrier to certification created by the simultaneous
application of dozens of states’ tort law.63 Like Williams, Weinstein expected
the parties to settle.64
Weinstein and Williams exercised the sort of power that Chayes had
observed in public law judges, with Weinstein’s debt to Chayes plain.65 Both
judges seized control of litigation without regard for individual plaintiff
preferences.66 Neither judge paid much heed to the constraints of the
substantive law on procedural possibilities, ignoring or assuming away legal
and factual differences among class members’ claims. Weinstein forthrightly
assumed the legislative mantle with his “national substantive rule.” Williams
did so as well, if less explicitly, with his intention to displace tort law remedies
with an equitable, pro rata distribution from a limited fund, as Rule
23(b)(1)(B) contemplates. Under the guise of managing litigation, both judges

58 Judge Weinstein took over Agent Orange after the initial judge, George Pratt, was elevated to
the Second Circuit. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN
THE COURTS 110 (1987). In an opinion giving barely cursory treatment to key issues like predominance,
Judge Pratt agreed to certify an opt-out class in 1980, but never entered the order. See id. at 68-69,
80-81; see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 791 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
59 Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433,
469 (1960).
60 Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 269, 288.
61 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 725-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
62 Id. at 731-32.
63 Id. at 724. For criticism, see SCHUCK, supra note 58, at 128-31.
64 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 723 (explaining this expectation).
65 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 834-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing
Chayes); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 473
(1994) (drawing parallels between mass tort cases and other public law cases); see also Francis E.
McGovern, Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting Case
Management, 19 FORUM 1, 7 (1983) (citing Chayes and stating that some commentators see toxic
substances litigation as a new form of public law litigation); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection
in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 908-16 (1984).
66 Elizabeth Joan Cabraser, Mandatory Certification of Settlement Classes, 10 CLASS ACT. REP.
151, 152 (1987).
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took on sole responsibility for significant policy problems, with Weinstein
explicit about his exercise of power as an alternative to legislative action.67
But in neither Dalkon Shield nor Agent Orange could claim-mobilization,
the regulatory conception’s normative pillar, justify an aggressive
administration of Rule 23 and with it such a robust exercise of judicial
power.68 Williams certified the Dalkon Shield class to manage an avalanche of
claims, not to trigger one. Thirty-four hundred individual plaintiffs filed suit
before the class certification motion in Agent Orange.69 Rather, the mavericks
invoked judicial economy and distributional equity to justify class
certification. Williams explained that the “tedious and frustrating task of
presiding over identical lawsuits” might “bankrupt both the state and federal
court systems.”70 Also, payouts determined by individuals’ race to judgment
might leave “later plaintiffs . . . without practical means of redress” as the
defendants’ funds run dry.71 Although his findings as to the likelihood that
claims would exceed the defendants’ assets were more thorough and careful
than Williams’s,72 Weinstein ultimately based his decision to certify a
mandatory Agent Orange class on a distributional concern. The law of punitive
damages might cap the defendants’ liability, and thus the first plaintiffs to
win punitive damages judgments would unfairly reap all the spoils.73
To critics, decisions like Agent Orange proved the pathological status of
American civil justice,74 and judicial colleagues of Williams and Weinstein
remained mostly skeptical of the mass tort class action.75 For example,
67 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that a
class action is the best means of demanding that “the government assume responsibility for the harm
caused our soldiers and their families by its use of Agent Orange”).
68 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 424-31 (1999) (enumerating the ways that mass
tort litigation does not fit within Chayes’ public law model).
69 In Camera, 6 CLASS ACTION REP. 273, 273 (1980).
70 Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324-25 (1983).
71 Id. at 325.
72 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 725-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
73 Id. at 725.
74 See, e.g., Tort Reform, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 22 (criticizing the Agent Orange
settlement); Contempt of Justice, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1985, at 28 (using the Agent Orange settlement
as evidence of problems with the American civil justice system); Is Suing the Only Way?, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 1985, at A20 (offering similar criticism).
75 Delaney v. Borden, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 44, 44 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that class certification is
inappropriate in mass tort actions); see also In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 721 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (confirming denial of class certification); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 612 F. Supp. 983 (D.D.C.
1985); Pearl v. Allied Corp., 102 F.R.D. 921, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (denying class certification);
Mertens v. Abbott Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38, 41-42 (D.N.H. 1983) (expressing skepticism of class
certification); Sanders v. Tailored Chem. Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1543, 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussing
prior cases that have generally denied class certification in mass tort actions); Ruland v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 94 F.R.D. 164, 165 (D. Conn. 1982) (denying class certification); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
93 F.R.D. 875, 877 (D.S.D. 1982) (denying class certification); David Berger, Litigation of a Class
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Weinstein’s decision withstood appellate review, but the Second Circuit noted
its expectation that his order would not “‘encourage the use of similar
procedures by . . . district courts in the future.’”76 The Ninth Circuit made short
work of Williams’s decision when 165 of the 166 plaintiffs’ lawyers with cases
affected by the grant of class certification sought interlocutory review.77 When
Carl Rubin, yet another maverick, certified a mandatory class of persons
exposed in utero to a pregnancy drug in 1984, the Sixth Circuit swiftly granted
the writ of mandamus that several plaintiffs’ lawyers requested.78 While Rubin’s
decision may have been “commendable” “[o]n pure policy grounds,” the Sixth
Circuit explained, it was “clearly erroneous as a matter of law.”79
II. AMCHEM
Within a decade, the federal judiciary committed as an institution to Rule 23’s
use to resolve dispersed mass tort litigation. A fear of total institutional
breakdown,80 prompted chiefly by asbestos litigation,81 moved the class action
from the periphery to the center of the mass tort stage. As their asbestos dockets
ballooned, judges watched with dismay as traditional litigation and other
processes proved unable to render accurate, timely, and nonarbitrary
determinations of claimants’ rights to recover. The Amchem settlement resulted.
Amchem involved a remarkable attempt to use a class action to settle claims
not yet filed by people exposed to asbestos. Had the settlement succeeded, a
right to claim compensation from a settlement trust fund would have replaced
millions of tort claims, a transformation of substantive rights achieved
Action, 18 FORUM 335, 339 (1982–83) (acknowledging reluctance of courts to certify classes in mass
tort claims).
76 In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting United
States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1969)); see also In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.,
818 F.2d 145, 151, 167-71 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding the Agent Orange settlement and stressing its
“nuisance” value).
77 In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856-57 (9th Cir.
1982); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43,
58 (1989) (describing plaintiffs’ lawyers’ reactions).
78 In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
79 Id. at 306.
80 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 731 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing the
need to use class action in order to cope with problems mass tort litigation created for the judiciary);
Irving R. M. Panzer & Thomas Earl Patton, Utilizing the Class Action Device in Mass Tort Litigation,
21 TORT & INS. L.J. 560, 568 (1985-86) (describing a fear that mass tort litigation is threatening to
undermine the judicial system).
81 Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986); In re School Asbestos
Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1986). The School Asbestos case did not involve personal injury
claims. Rather, it required a very different sort of analysis that arguably made class certification
easier and thus does not figure as a central chapter in this story. E.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond
Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475,
496-97 (1991).
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through the exercise of judicial power. Versions of the Amchem story have
several skillful tellings.82 A central theme in existing accounts involves the
effort of powerful plaintiffs’ lawyers cooperating with defendants to enrich
themselves at the expense of asbestos victims. Lost in these narratives of
corruption and collusion, however, is a central part of this history. Amchem
happened because the federal courts wanted a class action endgame. It was as
much the exercise of public power as it was private dealmaking.
By 1993, Rule 23’s use for mass tort litigation was no longer a maverick’s
frolic but the institutional preference of the federal courts. It nonetheless
failed. The surfeit of judicial power it required lacked a sufficient justification
or limiting principle.
A. The Failed Alternatives
The one-by-one litigation of asbestos cases, with an emphasis on individual
control over claims, was “largely a myth” by the time the asbestos drama turned
to Rule 23.83 The rising tide of asbestos filings pushed judges to exhaust various
aggregative techniques but also to pioneer a number of case management
strategies, which were all steps toward the sort of judicial power Chayes had
celebrated and Weinstein and Williams had exercised. Features of the Amchem
deal reflected both these years of futility and the innovations they spawned.
1. The Failure of Informal Aggregation
In the early 1980s, Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio
noticed that several dozen lawyers would appear every time he held a case
management conference in one of his asbestos cases. Even worse, these
lawyers, mostly representing the many defendants joined in each case,
sandwiched his conference in between ones elsewhere in the courthouse. The
hours they billed offended Lambros, as did the “endless stream of procedural
activity” these cases produced.84
To respond, Lambros came up with his “Ohio Asbestos Litigation”
system.85 He took over all of the asbestos cases pending in his district and
82 E.g., Patrick M. Hanlon, An Experiment in Law Reform: Amchem Products v. Windsor,
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1279, 1279 (2013); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1384-99 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While
the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1995).
83 Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 1899, 1913 (2002) [hereinafter Hensler, Time Goes By]; see also Hanlon, supra note 82, at 1287.
84 Interview with Thomas Lambros (Mar. 23, 2016), Transcript at 4 [hereinafter Lambros Interview].
85 Id. at 6; see also Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 480-90 (1986) (describing the implementation and ramifications
of the Ohio Asbestos Litigation plan).
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ordered that a single lawyer represent each asbestos company for all of its cases.
Working with two special masters, Lambros developed form questionnaires
designed to gather all essential information for settlement evaluation and had
one filled out for each case. Short interviews replaced formal depositions.86 The
information gleaned from this expedited discovery went to the RAND
Corporation, which generated proposed settlement amounts for each case based
on extensive historical data on comparable claims.87 Lambros scheduled
multiple cases for a single half-day status conference and encouraged the parties
to settle.88 At its peak, a single day’s work might produce 200-300 settlements,
with more than $150 million changing hands.89
Several other judges designed similar strategies, notably Robert Parker in
the Eastern District of Texas.90 Eventually, Lambros estimates, this group
supervised about eighty percent of the country’s asbestos docket.91 But the
asbestos tide swallowed their efforts.92 By 1988, Parker remarked, his attempt
to manage his way out of the asbestos morass reminded him of “the classical
tragedies.”93 The “lamentable state of affairs” had “seen two-thirds of total
dollars spent in asbestos litigation going to the coffers of lawyers and
witnesses,” he bemoaned, while victims died uncompensated.94
Informal aggregation happened outside the courtroom as well. Plaintiffs’
lawyers began cooperating extensively as early as 1978,95 and by the mid-1980s
leading firms had informally divided up the country, with each representing
hundreds, even thousands, of clients in different regions.96 On the defense
side, three years of negotiations pursued to replace the tort system with a
“private administrative agency” produced the Asbestos Claims Facility
(“ACF”) in 1985.97 The ACF resolved most of the 21,000 claims it settled
86
87
88
89
90

Lambros Interview, supra note 84, at 7-8.
Id. at 9; McGovern, supra note 85, at 488.
Lambros Interview, supra note 84, at 9.
Id.
See Judge Robert M. Parker, Memorandum to the Study Committee for the Efficient
Disposition of Asbestos-Related Cases, Jan. 22, 1982, Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d
334, 348 (5th Cir. 1982) (proposing standard procedures for handling asbestos-related cases).
91 Lambros Interview, supra note 84, at 10.
92 See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 271 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (noting that courts
have become so overwhelmed as to risk denying justice in asbestos-related cases).
93 Id. at 270.
94 Id. at 287.
95 Robin Reisig, The Man Who Took on Manville, AM. LAW., Feb. 1983, at 65, 66.
96 E-mail from Brent Rosenthal, Partner, Rosenthal Weiner (Apr. 21, 2016), Attachment at 2
[hereinafter Rosenthal Interview Notes]; Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States:
Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 263-64 (2005-06) (describing
the percentages of all asbestos cases filed that were represented by ten law firms in the 1980s).
97 Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 375, 375 (1985); see also Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims Resolution, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 13 (1990).
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through an ADR system designed to reduce transaction costs considerably.98
But the companies had disparate settlement preferences, and the ACF
collapsed in 1988.99 Some of the companies tried again, forming the Center
for Claims Resolution (“CCR”) to continue with a coordinated litigation
strategy.100 But the pace of filings increased, and defendants found themselves
paying to settle weaker and weaker claims.101
2. The Failure of Formal Aggregation
Johns-Manville’s decade-long struggle with bankruptcy fueled the
asbestos fire. “The General Motors of the asbestos industry,”102 Manville
petitioned for Chapter 11 reorganization in 1982 when relentless filings made
a future of inexhaustible liability inevitable.103 Six years of negotiations and
appeals followed before the Second Circuit in 1988 finally approved a
reorganization plan that steered all asbestos liability to a Manville-funded
trust.104 Within months of paying its first claim, however, the Manville trust
began to run dramatically low on funds,105 producing a mad scramble by
plaintiffs’ lawyers eager to get their claims paid before all the money was
gone.106 Manville quickly had to inject an additional $520 million to keep the
trust solvent,107 and the trust’s pledge to pay claims in full, based on their
value in the tort system,108 soon proved farcical.109

98 Fitzpatrick, supra note 97, at 14; Cynthia F. Mitchell & Paul M. Barrett, Trial and Error:
Novel Effort to Settle Asbestos Claims Fails as Lawsuits Multiply, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1988, at 1, 29.
99 Historical Society of the District of Columbia Circuit, Oral History of John Aldock, Fifth
Interview, May 16, 2010, at 154-55, http://dcchs.org/JohnDAldock/051610.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BCQVEKN] [hereinafter Aldock Oral History]; see also Interview with Gene Locks, Founding Partner,
Locks Law Firm (Apr. 19, 2016), Transcript at 5 [hereinafter Locks Interview].
100 Fitzpatrick, supra note 97, at 17; Interview with John Aldock, Retired Partner, Goodwin
Procter (Apr. 19, 2016), Notes at 1 [hereinafter Aldock Interview Notes].
101 Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1744 (2002).
102 Joint Appendix at 388, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, No. 96-270 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec.
16, 1996) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick Testimony]; see also Kane v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).
103 Kane, 843 F.2d at 639; see generally PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES
§ 11:11 (2016). Manville had badly misapprehended its asbestos liability. Shirley Hobbs Scheibla,
Heat on Asbestos: Legislative, Legal Challenges to Producers Mount, BARRON’S, Mar. 5, 1979, at 4
(quoting Manville’s president’s rosy projections regarding the company’s future liability).
104 In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
105 Id. at 754-58.
106 Id. at 758.
107 In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 653 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
108 Hensler, supra note 83, at 1919.
109 Id.
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Manville’s bankruptcy was a “game-changer.”110 Other companies noted
the difficulty Manville had faced in estimating its future liability.111 Plaintiffs’
lawyers expected that their clients would have to take haircuts and thus
predicted “devastation to the asbestos personal injury victims.”112 Their
primary target gone, these lawyers developed cases against a broader array of
defendants,113 looking harder for cases in a race to get ahead of more
bankruptcies.114 Consequently, filings exploded,115 with many of the newer
cases alleging marginal injuries or nothing at all.116 Some defendants
responded by refusing to settle claims en masse. They insisted on taking cases
to trial, worsening the backlog further.117
Parker’s Jenkins and Cimino experiments were another failed effort at
formal aggregation. Convinced that creative case management could not
staunch the asbestos bleeding,118 Parker certified an opt-out class of Eastern
District of Texas claimants (the Jenkins class) in 1985 to resolve issues
involving asbestos companies’ knowledge of their products’ dangerousness
and their liability for punitive damages.119 Individual plaintiffs would then
litigate individual causation and comparative fault issues in subsequent
“mini-trials.”120 The Fifth Circuit upheld Parker’s plan against efforts by the
defendants to scuttle it, remarking that “[n]ecessity moves us to change and
invent.”121 The effort seemed to work. Five weeks into the class trial, the
parties struck a $110 million deal and wiped Parker’s docket nearly clean.122
He conditioned his approval on the lawyers’ willingness to agree to arbitrate

110 Hanlon, supra note 82, at 1285; see also Interview with Joseph Rice, Founding Member,
MotleyRice (Apr. 25, 2016), Transcript at 4 [hereinafter Rice Interview].
111 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 66 (2005).
112 Plaintiffs’ Proffer on Preliminary Evaluation of Fairness at 3, Carlough et al. v. Amchem
Prods., Inc. et al., Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1993) (declaration of Joseph F. Rice)
[hereinafter Rice Declaration].
113 Hanlon, supra note 82, at 1285-86; JEB BARNES, DUST-UP: ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND
THE FAILURE OF COMMONSENSE POLICY REFORM 40 (2011).
114 SEE CARROLL ET AL., supra note 111, at 23; see also Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102, at
388; Joint Appendix at 603, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, No. 96-270 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16,
1996) (testimony of Robert Hatten) [hereinafter Hatten Testimony].
115 Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102, at 387.
116 Asbestos Claims/Claims Court Reference: Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (Aug. 10, 1988)
(testimony of John L. Baldwin); Michael Bates, Suit Alleges Asbestos Claims Were Fraudulent, NAT’L
L.J., Feb. 22, 1988, at 21.
117 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (noting
defendants’ strategy); Rice Interview, supra note 110, at 4.
118 Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 270 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
119 Id. at 281-82; Mullenix, supra note 81, at 488-95.
120 Jenkins, 109 F.R.D at 279.
121 Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986).
122 Rich Arthurs, Texas Judge Rides Herd on Asbestos Suits, LEGAL TIMES, May 19, 1986, at 6.
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all claims not covered by the class settlement.123 Some observers celebrated
this innovation as the golden ticket out of the asbestos morass.124
But Jenkins quickly fell apart. Filings outpaced ADR dispositions by a
considerable measure,125 and some defendants refused to settle cases as the plan
had anticipated.126 In response, Parker certified another Eastern District of
Texas class (the Cimino class) and ordered a multiphase, classwide trial to resolve
all elements of members’ claims. Trials on liability and damages for a
representative sample of plaintiffs would proceed. From these sample verdicts
Parker would extrapolate the defendants’ total liability, as well as determine how
much claimants in different injury categories would receive.127 Defendants—
who distrusted Parker and disliked his district—detested this plan,128 especially
after it produced anomalously high values for certain disease categories.129 They
successfully petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.130
B. The Institutional Commitment
Lambros and Parker, along with other colleagues, had tried to seize
control of asbestos litigation. But their efforts fell short, even as they
normalized dramatic departures from litigation in the mold of the “received
tradition” that Chayes had described. What came next was an institutional
commitment to the path they and their maverick predecessors had blazed.
1. Chaos
By the end of the 1980s, an “air of judicial desperation” had set in.131
Plaintiffs’ lawyers sensed that legislation,132 an onslaught of bankruptcies,133
or some other dramatic alteration to asbestos litigation to that point was
inevitable. Even litigators who had previously championed “traditional forms

123 MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARD A
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES 42 (1988).
124 Arthurs, supra note 122, at 6.
125 PETERSON & SELVIN, supra note 123, at 46 n.102.
126 Cimino v. Raymark Indust., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
127 RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 67-70 (2007).
128 Aldock Oral History, supra note 99, at 157.
129 NAGAREDA, supra note 127, at 69.
130 In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990).
131 Hanlon, supra note 82, at 1297; JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION
100 (2015).
132 Alison Frankel, Traitor to His Class, AM. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 55.
133 Rice Interview, supra note 110, at 5; Gordon Hunter, Plaintiffs’ Bar at War Over Asbestos
Caseload; Tens of Millions in Fees at Stake, TEX. LAW., Aug. 20, 1990, at 8.
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of dispute resolution” for asbestos cases134 warmed to a class action strategy
to bring asbestos litigation to a copacetic conclusion.135
In the late 1980s, Raymark Industries, drowning in new claims,136
announced that it would no longer offer anything but a nuisance value
settlement, no matter a case’s strength, unless a trial date—a very rare
commodity—approached.137 Worried that other companies would adopt this
“scorched earth” strategy, a plaintiffs’ lawyer agreed to move jointly with
Raymark for the certification of a mandatory class in an Atlanta federal
court.138 The district judge immediately granted the motion and enjoined all
other litigation against Raymark, without affording other lawyers a chance to
weigh in.139 “Panic ensued” among plaintiffs’ lawyers, who had suddenly lost
control over their cases.140 They sought relief from the Eleventh Circuit,
which vacated the certification order within a month.141 But this “hasty,
sloppy experiment” nonetheless convinced some lawyers that a better-crafted
class action strategy might work.142 These converts included Ron Motley, the
country’s most powerful asbestos lawyer, who had already begun global
settlement discussions with defendants.143
Judicial pressure began to mount, and not just from a trigger-happy judge
in Georgia. On June 25, 1990, the Federal Judicial Center convened a meeting
at the Dolly Madison House in Washington, D.C., with several key litigators
and the ten federal judges with the largest asbestos dockets in attendance.144
The attendees spitballed several solutions to the crisis145 and established an
ad hoc committee to pursue further study.146 This step was modest, but it
134 Gene Locks, Asbestos-Related Disease Litigation: Can the Beast be Tamed?, 28 VILL. L. REV.
1184, 1193 (1982-83).
135 Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 3.
136 See Cynthia F. Mitchell, Class-Action Status of Asbestos Lawsuits Against Raymark Industries
Overturned, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1988, at 1; see also Janet Guyon, U.S. Judge Consolidates Asbestos Cases
Against Raymark Into Class-Action Suit, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1988, at 6.
137 Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 3; Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102, at 390-91.
138 Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 3.
139 In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1988).
140 Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 3.
141 Guyon, supra note 136; Temple, 851 F.2d at 1269.
142 Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 4. So did the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In
re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989), which approved a class settlement related to
DES litigation. Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 4.
143 CCR’s president approached Motley in 1987 to begin these conversations. Transcript of
Fairness Hearing Before the Honorable Lowell A. Reed, Jr. at 78, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.
et al., Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick) [hereinafter
Fitzpatrick Hearing Testimony].
144 Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1851, 1861-62 (1997).
145 Aldock Interview Notes, supra note 100, at 2.
146 National Class Action Seen as Result of “Turf War”, 5-12 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 1, July
20, 1990.
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came with a clear and important message from the judges to the litigators:
end the chaos.147
Events confirmed litigators’ impression that “business as usual was [not]
going to be acceptable in the minds of the judges” any longer.148 Supervising
the mismanaged Manville Trust, Weinstein insisted that “the time is now ripe
for a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) global settlement” for asbestos litigation. If the parties
did not take action, he would.149 This prospect discomfited plaintiffs’ lawyers,
who remembered how Weinstein had slashed counsel fees in Agent Orange.150
But Lambros acted first, certifying a mandatory class of all present and future
claimants nationwide. Ostensibly, he did so to preserve the status quo “until
the ad hoc committee of judges and lawyers have the opportunity to formulate
a universal and multi-jurisdictional” solution.151 No one was happy.152 Indeed,
four federal judges in Louisiana ordered lawyers to ignore Lambros’s order.153
As a leading plaintiffs’ lawyer put it, things then got “stranger and
stranger.”154 The Dolly Madison House judges signed a joint order
superseding Lambros’s with a plan to join asbestos litigation into one
consolidated proceeding they designated In re: National Asbestos Class
Action.155 Lambros would supervise a nationwide Rule 23(b)(3) settlement
class action. Parker would preside over a nationwide Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
action for all non-settling defendants. Claims against six defendants with
diminished assets would go to Weinstein.156
This blatant end-run around the MDL process foundered in the Sixth
Circuit,157 but it gave plaintiffs’ lawyers more reason to worry that the federal
judiciary would soon take control of asbestos litigation away from them. At a
July 1990 meeting of leading asbestos lawyers, Thomas Henderson, a big player
147 Fitzpatrick Hearing Testimony, supra note 143, at 84; see also Aldock Interview Notes, supra
note 100, at 2.
148 Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102, at 392.
149 Stephen Labaton, The Bitter Fight Over the Manville Trust, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1990, at F1;
see also In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 727 (2d Cir. 1992); “Turf War”, supra
note 146.
150 Labaton, supra note 149, at F1.
151 In re Ohio Asbestos Litig., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15032, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 1990); see also
Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Suits Converted Into National Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1990, at D1.
152 See Doubt Cast Upon Judges’ Plan for Class Actions, 5-14 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 1, Aug.
17, 1990; Stephen Labaton, Business and the Law; Judicial Struggle in Asbestos Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
6, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/06/business/business-and-the-law-judicial-struggle-inasbestos-cases.html [https://perma.cc/2Y2Z-ZT6T].
153 Labaton, Judicial Struggle, supra note 152.
154 Don J. DeBenedictis, Asbestos Class Action Struck Down, 76 A.B.A. J. 14, 16 (1990) (quoting
Steven Kazan).
155 In re Nat’l Asbestos Litig., Nos. 1-90-CV 11,000, 1-90-CV-5000, 1990 WL 135758, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio & E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1990).
156 Id. at *2.
157 In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 915 F.2d 190, 191-92 (6th Cir. 1990).
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in Rust Belt cases, circulated a couple of memoranda describing a class action
strategy and criteria for compensating claimants pursuant to a global
settlement.158 One memo rallied support for Linscomb, a mandatory class action
filed in the Eastern District of Texas.159 Motley supported Henderson. “If the
parties don’t reach consensual agreement [on a settlement framework],” Motley
warned, “the courts will decide it and we will not control our future.”160 Another
attempt by Weinstein to seize control of a large tranche of asbestos litigation in
December 1990161 only “bolstered the conviction” of the Linscomb lawyers “that
some sort of mass resolution was inevitable.”162
Leading asbestos attorney Fred Baron had filed the very first asbestos
class action in the early 1970s, as a longhaired civil rights lawyer “into the idea
of freedom and justice.”163 Ironically, he now led the fight against the class
action strategy, opposing the Linscomb tactic bitterly.164 But most asbestos
lawyers now accepted a class action solution.165 In contrast, asbestos
companies hated the Eastern District of Texas and long resisted a class action
strategy.166 They refused to bargain with the Linscomb “sword of Damocles”
hanging over their heads.167
2. Judicial Control
By early 1991, a judicial takeover of asbestos litigation through a class
action had become the institutional preference of the federal courts. After
Lambros’s failed effort to create a “mini MDL,”168 Chief Justice Rehnquist
appointed an ad hoc committee to study the asbestos litigation crisis.169 Its
March 1991 report described a “situation” of “critical dimensions” that “is
getting worse.”170 “[V]irtually every federal judge who has tried to cope with

158 Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable Lowell Reed at 88, Carlough et al. v. Amchem
Prods., Inc. et al., Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1993) (Statement of Gene Locks).
159 See Arthur R. Miller & Price Ainsworth, Resolving the Asbestos Personal-Injury Litigation
Crisis, 10 REV. LITIG. 419, 431-32 (1991).
160 Hunter, Plaintiffs’ Bar, supra note 133, at 8.
161 See Frankel, Traitor, supra note 132, at 55; Andrew Blum, A Routine Hearing Quickly Turns
Less So, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 24, 1990, at 8; Fitzpatrick Hearing Testimony, supra note 143, at 90.
162 Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 4.
163 Frankel, Traitor, supra note 132, at 55.
164 Hunter, Plaintiffs’ Bar, supra note 133, at 8; Plaintiff Bar is a House Divided, 5-14 MEALEY’S
LITIG. REP. ASB. 2, Aug. 17, 1990.
165 Rice Declaration, supra note 112, at 10.
166 Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102, at 394, 285, 292; Scheibla, supra note 103, at 4.
167 Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102, at 394.
168 Lambros Interview, supra note 84, at 11.
169 McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation, supra note 144, at 1862.
170 Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, Mar. 1991,
in Asbestos Litig. Crisis in Fed. and State Courts, Hearings Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop.
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a substantial asbestos docket agrees that this litigation impasse cannot be
broken except by aggregate or class proceedings,” the report declared. It
insisted that “class actions were devised for precisely these kinds of cases,”171
an assertion that would have struck federal judges as silly a decade earlier.
The committee recommended that Congress and the Advisory Committee
explore legislation or rule changes to solve the asbestos crisis with a class
action, should Congress not replace the tort system with some sort of
compensation scheme.172 Responding to this request,173 the Federal Civil
Rules Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 23 designed “to
enlarge the opportunity for mass tort litigation.”174
Meanwhile, eight of the Dolly Madison House judges asked the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to consolidate all federal asbestos
litigation.175 The JPML had previously denied such requests five times.176 But
the institutional preference of the federal judiciary for consolidation was clear,
and the JPML could not refuse again.177 Hoping that the transferee court would
“solv[e] the ‘asbestos mess,’” the JPML sent the cases to Charles Weiner in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.178 Tens of thousands of cases traveled to
Philadelphia with most observers’ expectation that they would never return.179
Weiner had a reputation as a “master settler,”180 with a well-known
“preference for a negotiated resolution of asbestos claims, rather than
litigation . . . .”181 In keeping with his judicial colleagues’ desires,182 Weiner
halted almost all litigation and waited for the parties to propose a
resolution.183 Because an inability to get trial dates diminished the likelihood
and Judicial Admin. of the Comm. on the Judiciary at 383, 102nd Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Oct. 24, 1991,
Feb. 26 and 27, 1992.
171 Id. at 403.
172 Id. at 409-20.
173 Minutes, Oct. 21-23, 1993, at 174, in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, MAY 1, 1997 [hereinafter
WORKING PAPERS].
174 Minutes, Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 1990, Meeting, at 162, in
1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 173; see also Minutes, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Oct. 2123, 1993, at 174-175, in 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 173.
175 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 417 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
176 Id. at 417.
177 Aldock Interview Notes, supra note 100, at 2.
178 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. at 424.
179 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 111, at 47; Federal Asbestos Cases Stayed, Transferred to
Philadelphia, 6-13 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 3, Aug. 2, 1991.
180 Hensler, Time Goes By, supra note 83, at 1901; Locks Interview, supra note 99, at 7.
181 Docket 292: Memorandum and Order at 16, Carlough et al. v. Amchem Prods., Inc. et al.,
Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. April 15, 1993).
182 Coffee, supra note 82, at 1390 (quoting letter from Parker to Weiner); Staff of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, supra note 170, at 28 (quoting Judge Joseph F. Weis Jr.).
183 Interview with Brent Rosenthal (Apr. 22, 2016), Transcript at 12 [hereinafter Rosenthal
Interview].
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of settlement,184 plaintiffs’ lawyers tried to free cases from Weiner’s chambers,
variously described as a “dark hole” or a “plaintiffs’ Armageddon.”185 But the
JPML rejected remand requests they made and instructed the parties to work
with Weiner to settle everything.186
3. Following Instructions
To the “extremely disappointed” Motley,187 Weiner had “transformed
what could have been a global resolution of the asbestos cases into a surreal
farce.”188 He and his colleague Joseph Rice nonetheless continued settlement
discussions, which CCR chose to pursue after earlier negotiations with a
larger set of lawyers had failed.189 Motley and Rice were the “biggest dogs,”
and any deal required their buy-in.190 The parties also brought in Gene Locks,
a prominent Philadelphia lawyer with a sizeable asbestos inventory.191
By this point, a growing backlog had convinced CCR to replace what had
been a liberal settlement practice192 with a “deferral registry” strategy.193 To
discourage filings by unimpaired claimants,194 CCR refused to settle any case
without an impending trial date unless the firm representing the claimant put
future unimpaired clients it might represent on a court’s inactive docket.
Only if the future client met certain medical criteria would his claim come
off this deferral registry.195 CCR made some progress convincing courts of

184 Staff of the Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 170, at 163 (testimony of William Schwarzer)
[hereinafter Schwartzer Testimony].
185 Aldock Interview Notes, supra note 100, at 2; Henderson Accuses Two Committee Members of
Side Deals, 7-17 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 2, Oct. 2, 1992.
186 Plaintiffs’ Chances for MDL Remand Questionable, 7-17 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 1, Oct. 2, 1992.
187 Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before the Honorable Lowell A. Reed, Jr. at 158, Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc. et al., Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1994) (statement of Fred Baron,
quoting letter from Motley); see also Federal Asbestos Cases Stayed, Transferred to Philadelphia, 6-13
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 3, Aug. 2, 1991.
188 Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before the Honorable Lowell A. Reed, Jr. at 41, Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc. et al., Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1994) (statement of Fred Baron,
quoting letter from Motley).
189 Fitzpatrick Hearing Testimony, supra note 143, at 78; Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102,
at 389-90, 411. A lump sum offer to settle pending and future cases failed in 1991 because plaintiffs’
firms viewed their right to negotiate settlements individually as “sacred.” Rice Declaration, supra
note 112, at 15; see also Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102, at 409.
190 Aldock Interview Notes, supra note 100 at 2; Rice Interview, supra note 110, at 9-10.
191 Locks Interview, supra note 99 at 8; Hanlon, supra note 82 at 1299; Aldock Interview Notes,
supra note 100 at 3.
192 Fitzpatrick Hearing Testimony, supra note 143, at 143.
193 See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos
Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541 (1992) (arguing that courts with large asbestos mandates
should mandate deferral registries).
194 Aldock Interview Notes, supra note 100, at 1.
195 Fitzpatrick Testimony, supra note 102, at 439.
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this strategy’s wisdom by the time the JPML acted.196 In August 1992 it forced
plaintiffs’ lawyers to accept a pleural registry for future claims in exchange
for inventory settlements of then-pending cases in New England.197
Motley feared that the New England settlement would offer a “blueprint”
to Weiner for how to resolve the MDL,198 and gridlock in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania gave the defendants additional leverage. But the plaintiffs
had leverage too. They increasingly filed cases in state courts to avoid the
MDL’s reach.199 “Worse than unfriendly” to defendants,200 some state judges
scheduled mass consolidated trials as a response to CCR’s deferral registry
strategy.201 A mass trial of 8,500 claims in a Maryland state court, for example,
produced a huge plaintiff ’s verdict in July 1992.202 A federal class action was
attractive to CCR because it would bring all future claims under Weiner’s
supervision and beyond state courts’ reach.203
Almost all of the major players now supported a class action strategy. Each
plaintiffs’ firm would settle its existing inventories of claims in side deals,
then agree to the class settlement requiring all future asbestos claimants (the
class members) to seek compensation from a settlement fund. By Fall 1992
rumors of this deal started flying, especially after Motley urged plaintiffs’
lawyers “to serve and file as many of your unfiled claims as soon as possible”
lest they be treated as future claims subject to the class settlement’s reach.204
Some colleagues reacted indignantly. “This [is] not another chicken little, sky
is falling cry,” two plaintiffs’ lawyers wrote to the asbestos bar. They urged
“decisiv[e]” action to thwart “the futures class action which we have vowed to

196
197
198

Id. at 608.
Fitzpatrick Hearing Testimony, supra note 143, at 8; id. at 14.
Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before the Honorable Lowell A. Reed, Jr. at 158, Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc. et al., Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1994) (statement of Fred Baron,
quoting Aug. 21, 1992, memorandum from Motley to “all asbestos personal injury co-counsel”)
[hereinafter Baron Statement].
199 E.g., Schwarzer Testimony, supra note 184, at 163; CARROLL ET AL., supra note 111, at 61;
Hensler, Time Goes By, supra note 83, at 269; 4 Companies Agree to Settle Asbestos Case in Maryland,
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/06/business/4-companies-agree-tosettle-asbestos-case-in-maryland.html [https://perma.cc/F45P-TUBC].
200 Aldock Interview Notes, supra note 100, at 1.
201 Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Unattended Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26
REV. LITIG. 583, 594 (2007); see also CARROLL ET AL., supra note 111, at 33.
202 4 Firms Must Pay Punitive Damages in Asbestos Case, Jury Rules, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-08-11/news/mn-5294_1_punitive-damages; Liz Spayd, Baltimore
Jury Finds for Workers in Largest Asbestos Liability Trial, WASH. POST (July 14, 1992),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/07/14/baltimore-jury-finds-for-workers-inlargest-asbestos-liability-trial/2cf0224c-7a42-45af-899804a99ce56c13/?utm_term=.a54284084158
[https://perma.cc/V26R-29PJ].
203 Aldock Interview Notes, supra note 100, at 2.
204 Baron Statement, supra note 198, at 158..
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oppose.”205 Most, however, proved cooperative.206 CCR offered firms the
same deal it gave Motley, Rice, and Locks: a lump sum to settle already-filed
cases in exchange for an agreement to abstain from filing cases in the future
that did not meet certain medical criteria.207 Many of these agreements were
dated January 14, 1993. They provided that the class settlement, which
incorporated the same medical criteria as conditions for claimant eligibility,
would supersede their provisions with respect to future claims.208
Motley, Rice, and Locks filed the class action complaint on January 15, 1993.
Weiner certified the class on January 29, “mandat[ing] the parties to move [the]
matter to final resolution.”209 To opponents of the class action, “opposition
appeared to be hopeless.”210 Now established as an institutional reality, supported
by significant stakeholders, the mass tort class action seemed to have triumphed.
C. The Collapse
The rest of the story is familiar. Fred Baron led a renegade crew of
objectors in bitter legal combat against the settling parties.211 After more than
a year of litigation and a two-month fairness hearing,212 the district court
approved the class settlement.213 The court formally certified a Rule 23(b)(3)
class but did not go through the rule’s analytical steps.214 Instead of evaluating
the balance of common and individual issues, for instance, the court simply
pronounced the class members’ interest in prompt, adequate payments as
205 Letter to Fellow Asbestos Litigators from Donald I. Marlin and Mark H. Iola, Independent
Asbestos Litigation Council, Oct. 26, 1992, at 2, 4, at Docket 807: Memorandum in Support of the
Settling Parties’ Joint Motion for an Order Establishing a Second Notice and Opt-Out Period for
Class Members Who Have Requested Exclusion From the Class, in Order to Remedy Improper
Communications by Counsel Opposing the Settlement, Exhibit 18, Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc. et al., Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1994).
206 Hatten Testimony, supra note 114, at 600; Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 8.
207 Exhibit to Motion to Declassify Certain Documents As Confidential at 3, Carlough et al.
v. Amchem Prods., Inc. et al., Civ. No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1994); Joint Appendix at 520,
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, No. 96-270 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1996) (testimony of Michael
Rooney); id. at 523-24.
208 Exhibit to Motion to Declassify Certain Documents, supra note 207.
209 Docket Entry 517: Order at 4, Carlough et al. v. Amchem Prods., Inc. et al., Civ. No. 930215 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1993).
210 Rosenthal Interview Notes, supra note 96, at 8.
211 Id. at 12.
212 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 260-61 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (describing an
“extensive and protracted” fairness hearing that “involve[d] the testimony of some twenty-nine
witnesses . . . during 18 hearing days over a period of over five weeks”).
213 Id. at 334. Lowell Reed managed almost all of the litigation. Weiner referred the class certification
and settlement approval motion to him for a report and recommendation. One participant believes that
upon referring the case, Weiner was “confident that Judge Reed would fulfill what Judge Weiner
understood to be his mission as related by the [JPML].” Rosenthal Interview, supra note 183, at 11.
214 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 334.
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sufficient to meet the predominance requirement.215 This was Rule 23’s
administration at its most extreme, even more so than what Weinstein and
Williams had done a decade earlier, and well beyond what proponents of the
class action’s regulatory conception had urged in the 1970s. The practice also
spread, and district courts in the early 1990s certified a number of mass tort
classes.216 By 1996, the Advisory Committee proposed amendments to Rule
23 to facilitate the resolution of mass torts through class settlements.217
But the wheels quickly fell off. The Breast Implants class settlement,
heralded in 1994 as a model for mass tort litigation management,218
collapsed in 1995 under the weight of tens of thousands of questionable
claims.219 The same year the Seventh Circuit decertified the blood factor
class in Rhone-Poulenc.220 The Amchem deal drew intense critical fire for
alleged collusion between class counsel and CCR, as the former were
accused of accepting huge fees to sign off on a deal that seemed to benefit
the defendants while selling out asbestos victims. In 1996, the Third Circuit
vacated the Amchem class,221 and the Fifth Circuit vacated the Castano
tobacco class.222 When the Supreme Court confirmed the demise of the
Amchem settlement in 1997, it hammered the penultimate nail in the mass
tort class action’s coffin.223 After a few last gasps,224 this litigation seemed
destined for its grave.

215
216

Id. at 315-16.
E.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 544 (E.D. La. 1995); Wadleigh v. RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1994); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1128, 1128 (N.D. Ala. 1993); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 138, 141
(S.D. Ohio 1992); Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628, 630 (D.S.C. 1992);
Dante v. Dow Corning Corp., 143 F.R.D. 136, 136 (S.D. Ohio 1992); In re Cordis Corp. Pacemaker
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 850, C-3-86-543, 1992 WL 754061, at *16 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
217 See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23: Class Actions
(Aug. 1996), in 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 173, at 143-47.
218 Sheila L. Birnbaum & J. Rusell Jackson, Recent Multibillion-Dollar Settlements Could Serve As
Models for the Resolution of Mass Products Liability and Toxic Tort Litigation, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at 14.
219 See NAGAREDA, supra note 127, at 35.
220 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
221 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
222 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
223 See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997). In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815 (1999), the Supreme Court again refused an attempt to resolve asbestos liability through
a class settlement.
224 See, e.g., Flanagan v. Ahearn, 134 F.3d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1998) (2-1 per curiam) (“After oral
argument and reconsideration, we can find nothing in the Amchem opinion that changes our prior
decision [to certify the mass tort class action settlement]. We again affirm.”)
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D. The Weight Litigation Can Bear
The Dolly Madison House judges, the ad hoc committee, and the JPML
all favored a class settlement as the solution to the asbestos crisis. The
Advisory Committee proposed to generalize this preference for other mass
torts.225 Defendants had come around as well, as had powerful plaintiffs’
lawyers. But the Third Circuit opinion upholding the Amchem deal “just
wouldn’t write.”226 The success of the mass tort class action would have
suggested that, under certain circumstances, judges can exercise remarkable
powers of law reform, subject to limits that resist principled administration.
But as the Supreme Court ultimately concluded, “Rule 23 . . . cannot carry
the large load . . . heaped upon it.”227
In his magisterial treatment of mass torts, Richard Nagareda described the
endpoint of this litigation, a global settlement, as a type of “privatized law
reform.”228 The lawyers negotiating the deal would aim to replace claimants’
preexisting rights to sue in tort with a right to seek compensation from a settlement
fund, or what Nagareda called a “private administrative regime.”229 Nagareda
interpreted the Supreme Court’s Amchem opinion to express a straightforward
idea: this exercise of what amounts to legislative power requires something other
than what the settlement purports to accomplish to legitimate it.230
Nagareda’s emphasis on the dealmaking attorneys as the prime movers—
hence the “private” in “private administrative regime”—seems incomplete in
light of the path asbestos litigation followed to the Amchem deal. To a
significant extent, the lawyers responded to judicial pressure. The episode
fits Chayes’ description of judging quite well; indeed, given the institutional
commitment of the federal judiciary to the class action strategy, it is arguably
the apotheosis of public law litigation. The Amchem settlement, to Nagareda
a privatized compensation scheme, nicely fits Chayes’ description of a public
law remedy. This is one where “the trial judge . . . become[s] the . . . manager
of complex forms of ongoing relief,” with “widespread effects on persons not
before the court,” and with the judge’s “continuing involvement in
administration and implementation.”231 As much as the mass tort class action
involved private dealmaking, so too did it implicate judicial power.
225 Weinstein, one of the original judicial mavericks, also persisted the longest. He tried to
certify a class of smokers in 2002. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated
and remanded by In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
226 Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 595, 603 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Judge Becker).
227 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629.
228 NAGAREDA, supra note 127, at 220.
229 Id. at 76, 220.
230 Id. at 83.
231 Chayes, Role, supra note 30, at 1284.
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But Nagareda’s basic point, slightly altered, remains apt: something other
than litigation’s outcome must legitimate the power the judge wields as she
supervises the process. To proponents of a muscular Rule 23 in the 1970s, its
regulatory efficacy provided the class action with crucial justification. The
class action’s effectiveness came from its power to mobilize claims and thereby
vindicate regulatory regimes often designed for private enforcement.232 The
class action’s regulatory conception provided the extensive judicial power
Rule 23 blessed with its normative foundation, but it also suggested an
important limit: if claimants can vindicate regulatory regimes without
aggregation, then its use triggers concerns of illegitimacy.
Some advocates tried to defend the mass tort class action in regulatory
conception terms, but the obvious disconnect between the onslaught of
individually filed DES, Dalkon Shield, asbestos, and other such claims that
had motivated the episode in the first place and the claim mobilization
justification rendered such efforts incoherent.233 The more plausible
justifications were what Weinstein and Williams, the original mavericks, had
first identified—judicial economy and distributional equity.234 But Amchem
suggested that neither judicial economy nor distributional equity could
provide administrable limits on judicial power.
Whether massive numbers of filings threaten to overwhelm the federal
courts, a key to the judicial economy rationale, requires an empirical
determination. If ever the federal courts could make this judgment correctly,
asbestos litigation provided the best opportunity. But even here judgments
about some threshold threat of judicial gridlock failed due to the continual
evolution of the asbestos litigation system. The state of the asbestos world in
January 1993 illustrates this. The MDL order had pushed filings into state
courts, relieving federal colleagues of an increasing share of the litigation.
Pleural registries had begun to spread.235 The Manville trust drew congressional
attention and would soon prompt the enactment of § 524(g) to the Bankruptcy

232
233

FARHANG, supra note 5, at 5-16.
The plaintiffs in the Blood Factor class action made the following self-contradictory
argument in favor of class certification: “Here, the class action device could . . . provid[e] the
majority of victims their best, and perhaps only, chance of obtaining redress for their injuries. And,
what is the certain alternative? Likely thousands of cases in the state and federal courts.” Plaintiffs’
Memorandum in Further Support of Their Motion for Class Certification at 14-15, In re Factor
Concentrate Litigation, MDL No. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
234 See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1988); see also In re A.H.
Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 726 (4th Cir. 1989); American Bar Ass’n, Revised Final Report and
Recommendations of the Commission on Mass Torts, Nov. 1989, Separate Statement of Paul D.
Rheingold, at 1e; Samuel Issacharoff, Administering Damage Awards in Mass-Tort Litigation, 10 REV.
LITIG. 463, 469 (1991).
235 Mark A. Behrens & Monica G. Parham, Stewardship for the Sick: Preserving Assets for Asbestos
Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2001).
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Code.236 The firms that struck inventory deals in anticipation of Amchem helped
to pioneer what has become a norm, however dubious, for mass tort litigation—
a settlement agreement that effectively pays the firm to stop filing cases.237
If mass torts “have persistently resolved themselves into what are essentially
bureaucratized, aggregate settlement structures,”238 then the determination of
when the threat of gridlock crosses a threshold to justify the sort of power a
mass tort class action licenses is almost impossible to make.239 If this was so for
a mass tort with asbestos’s extensive track record, an attempt to determine the
gridlock threshold amounted to “pure speculation” in other contexts.240
Likewise, if the danger of distributional inequity, the second justification,
could have provided an administrable limit on judicial power, it would have
done so in asbestos. The litigation and settlement of tens of thousands of
claims offered a rich data set upon which courts could judge just how
unequally claimants had fared, how much money went to something other
than their compensation, and how much better they would fare under a class
action settlement regime.241 Even here, however, judgment proved impossibly
subjective. The Amchem class members would have received less than what
Motley, Rice, and Locks obtained for their inventory clients through the side
deals, and what they had obtained historically for their clients.242 Were
historical averages or the side settlement figures the right baseline? In light
of the Manville example, could the negotiating parties rightly insist on some
parsimony to ensure sufficient assets in the future? Did the exclusion of
unimpaired claimants from recovery better reflect their value in a litigation
system increasingly inclined toward pleural registries? If after more than a
decade of experimentation a court could not answer such questions
objectively for asbestos litigation, the likelihood it could do so with
confidence for less well-litigated claims was low.
In hindsight, the failure of the mass tort class action seems all but inevitable.
In the early 1990s, litigation’s institutional footprint shrank in a number of
236 E.g., Mark D. Plevin et al., The Future Claims Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos
Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy
Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 275-80 (2006).
237 Interview with Paul Rheingold, Founder, Rheingold, Giuffra, Ruffo & Plotkin (July 6,
2016), Transcript at 6, 7.
238 Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (2004).
239 Cf. John A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990, 997
(1995) (“Unless we are confronting a systemic emergency that requires some form of legal triage, it
is hard to justify tilting this equilibrium radically in the direction of collective adjudication.”).
240 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996); see also In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
241 Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
941, 966 (1995).
242 E.g., Coffee, supra note 82, at 1397-98.
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domains. Concerns over a litigation explosion and the rise of an imperial
judiciary had become gospel for successive presidential administrations,243 and
such criticisms of American civil justice fueled Congress’s litigation agenda
after the mid-term elections of 1994.244 Chayes’s celebratory story about
litigation, with the fulsome judicial power it included, faded, to be replaced by
one markedly more suspicious of the process’s aggressive deployment.245
Legislated limits to securities fraud and civil rights class actions in the mid1990s reflected this new restrictive spirit, as did a package of Rule 23
amendments the Advisory Committee considered in 1996.246
To one participant in the Amchem episode, the settlement’s approval came
from the judge’s “need to act . . . in a legislative manner.”247 The class action
strategy emerged after a decade of other failures, including Congress’s
repeated inability to replace the embattled tort system with an alternative
compensation regime.248 The sense that courts had assumed too much
prerogative belonging to other branches fueled the reaction to judicial power
in the 1970s, one that ultimately bore policy fruit in the 1990s.249 Had
litigation unbound in the guise of the mass tort class action endured in this
time of retrenchment, its success would have proven a striking anomaly.
III. THE AFTERLIFE OF THE MASS TORT CLASS ACTION
The mass tort experiment has had a long and powerful afterlife for the
class action. Its doctrinal influence remains potent, as decisions like Amchem
and Ortiz continue to govern Rule 23’s administration.250 Class action
243 See, e.g., STUART M. GERSON ET AL., A PLAN TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S SYSTEM OF CIVIL
JUSTICE FROM THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS (1992); U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY (1986).
244 The Contract With America Congress enacted securities fraud class action reform, and it passed
legislation prohibiting lawyers funded by the Legal Services Corporation from litigating class actions.
E.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
371, 386 (2016) (describing proposals to “stem the endless tide of litigation”); Alan W. Houseman &
Linda E. Perle, Securing Equal Justice for All: A Brief History of Civil Legal Assistance in the United States,
CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY 36-37 (2013) (describing Congressional and internal efforts to weaken
the Legal Services Corporation), http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/publication-1/SecuringEqual-Justice-for-All-2013-Revision.pdf [https://perma.cc/62K3-J4ZJ].
245 E.g., COFFEE, supra note 131.
246 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23: Class Actions, in
1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 173, at 143-47.
247 Interview with Brian Wolfman, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center (Apr. 14, 2016), Transcript at 11.
248 E.g., BARNES, supra note 113.
249 E.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 36, at 8.
250 According to Westlaw, Amchem was cited in twenty-seven federal court opinions in
December 2016 alone. Ortiz was cited nearly fifty times in 2016.
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jurisprudence continues to owe a great deal to the episode. John Coffee drew
extensively on asbestos and other mass torts to develop his influential
entrepreneurial litigation model.251 His and others’ concern with agency costs
arising in profit-seeking aggregate litigation cast the class action in a different
light from what proponents of the regulatory conception celebrated in the
1970s.252 To these proponents, the judge played a leading, heroic role,
remaking social and economic orders through litigation while exercising
broad, nearly unbound power. Viewed through an entrepreneurial litigation
lens, the judge acts more as an observer trying to keep lawyers, now at center
stage, from harming class members.
Perhaps most importantly, the mass tort class action contributed
significantly to an institutional shift in the structure of class action governance.
This shift, which reinvigorated appellate control over the elaboration of class
action doctrine, ensures that Rule 23 and the judicial power it licenses remain
confined within strict limits. The courts of appeals actively policed class action
doctrine in the early 1970s.253 By 1978, however, avenues for appellate review
of class certification decisions narrowed significantly.254 The 1980s passed with
a remarkable dearth of appellate guidance on controverted issues.255 The
district courts had wide discretion for Rule 23’s administration, an allocation
of authority between court levels that facilitated the broad exercise of judicial
power within relaxed legal constraints.
The mass tort class action drew appellate courts back into class action
administration in at least two ways. First, parties fighting the certification of mass
tort classes petitioned for extraordinary appellate relief with particular success.256
In other contexts, courts of appeals in the 1970s and 1980s had to surmount
high barriers to review class certification orders.257 But appellate courts could
not ignore the largesse of judicial power that the certification of a mass tort
251
252

COFFEE, supra note 131, at 95-118.
E.g., id. at 117; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate
Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165 (2013).
253 Cf. William H. Becker, The Class Action Conflict: A 1976 Report, 75 F.R.D. 167, 174–87 (1976)
(describing the various ways parties could appeal class certification decisions).
254 See generally 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1802 (1986) (discussing doctrine related to the appealability of class certification decisions).
255 See Marcus, Litigation and Legitimacy, supra note 2, at 6-9.
256 By one calculation, 42% of interlocutory appeals or petitions for mandamus that produced
appellate orders from 1987 to 1997 came in mass torts cases. Statement of Brian C. Anderson, in 4
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 173, at 687-90.
257 E.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing
various conditions to the issuance of a writ of mandamus to review class certification orders); see also
Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Certification and Interlocutory
Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1555-57
(2000) (describing doctrines used to achieve interlocutory review of class action certification decisions).
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class required, and review of the certification of mass tort classes became
common.258 By the mid-1990s, the mass tort class action had reinvigorated
appellate input into the design of class action doctrine.
Second, the mass tort class action prompted a round of rulemaking in the
1990s that ultimately led to Rule 23(f). Proposals to facilitate interlocutory
review of class certification orders had surfaced in the 1970s and 1980s.259 But
it took the mass tort class action to convince the Advisory Committee to end
its “moratorium” on the consideration of Rule 23 amendments in 1991.260 This
round of rulemaking produced Rule 23(f), itself importantly connected to the
circuit-level mass tort decisions.261 The committee considered a wide range of
potentially transformative proposals, prompting deep conflict and prolonged
debate.262 But renewed appellate engagement with Rule 23 led the committee
to cede the prerogative for more important adjustments to class action doctrine
to the federal courts.263 The committee expected that the courts of appeals
would play an important supervisory role for the class action going forward.264
Rule 23(f) has effectively entrenched and expanded appellate engagement
with class action doctrine in domains well beyond mass tort litigation, resulting
in the elaboration of a legal regime for the governance of the class action.265 To
a district judge like Lambros or Weiner, the class certification decision was a
discretionary exercise in case management. To a court of appeals, a Rule 23(f)
appeal is an invitation to draw legal boundaries.266 As these boundaries have
proliferated, a district court’s range of discretion narrows.267

258 As discussed in Parts I(B) and II(A) (2), courts of appeals reviewed almost every significant
district court decision certifying a mass tort class in the 1980s.
259 See, e.g., A.B.A. Section of Litigation, Report and Recommendations of the Special
Committee on Class Action Improvements 10 (Sept. 25, 1985), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-8410-94-1984 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
260 Report of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, May 17, 1993, at 1.
261 E.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 739 (2013);
Margaret V. Sachs, Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: The Untold Story of Fraud-on-the-Market, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1229-31 (2015).
262 The records of the committee’s deliberations fill four volumes of working papers. See FJC
Studies and Related Publications, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-andarchives-rules-committees/fjc-studies-and-related-publications [https://perma.cc/5WYY-8843].
263 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal
Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1515-16 (2017).
264 Civil Rules Committee Minutes, Nov. 9 & 10, 1995, in 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 173, at 234.
265 E.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97, 170 (2009); see also Brian Anderson & Patrick McLain, A Progress Report on Rule 23(f): Five Years
of Immediate Class Certification Appeals, ANDREWS AUTO. LITIG. REP., June 1, 2004, at 3.
266 E.g., Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999); Nagareda, supra
note 265, at 104-05.
267 Cf. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d
372, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (overturning class certification in a securities class action).
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Not only has a regime developed, it has developed to constrain district
court power to certify classes.268 For most of Rule 23(f)’s existence,
conservatives have dominated the courts of appeals, with predictable results
for class action doctrine.269 But permanent structural features of appellate
review unrelated to ideology have also generated this retrenchment. One of
these features is attitudinal and relational. An appellate judge who votes to
reverse the denial of class certification increases the likelihood that the district
court would feel obliged to certify the class on remand. The district court,
supposed to have “wide discretion” over the class certification decision,270 is
now saddled with a time-consuming case it had already judged as
unmanageable.271 A decision vacating a grant of class certification, in contrast,
frees the district court of this burden, even if it is a welcome one. Also,
plaintiffs’ lawyers file significantly fewer Rule 23(f) petitions than
defendants’.272 Parties’ and lawyers’ incentives, another structural feature,
readily explains this reality.273 It only stands to reason that case law will tend
to drift to favor the side that sets the appellate agenda.274
268 See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee, III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations:
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 784 (2010) (“In practice, Rule 23(f) has
almost certainly contributed to the restriction in class certification during the past decade.”); see also
William Kolasky & Kevin Stemp, Antitrust Class Actions: More Rigor, Fewer Shortcuts, 30 CLASS ACTION
REP., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 3. Bob Klonoff reports that, of the 144 appeals by defendants that courts of
appeals accepted between 1998 and 2012, defendants prevailed in 101 of them. In contrast, plaintiffs won
only 26 out of 65 cases they had appealed during this period. Klonoff, supra note 261, at 741.
269 See Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction, BROOKINGS
(Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2013/12/30-staffing-federal-judiciary2013-no-breakthrough-year [https://perma.cc/Q2SP-485E]; see also Burbank & Farhang, supra note 263.
270 Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2010).
271 For a dated empirical study of the time class actions require of district courts, see THOMAS E.
WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 23 (1996).
272 See Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion in
the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 290 (2008) (documenting 198 plaintiff petitions and 278
defendant petitions in the circuits between 1998 and 2006).
273 A sophisticated plaintiffs’ lawyer should be significantly more disinclined than a defendant to seek
Rule 23(f) review. The likelihood that a company will be sued in multiple securities fraud class actions is very
low, for example. E.g., Dr. Renzo Comolli & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation:
2014 Full-Year Review, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, Jan. 20, 2015, at 4, http://www.nera.com/
content/dam/nera/publications/2015/Full_Year_Trends_2014_0115.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WZC4-9R6Y]
(providing data on the number of securities class actions filed against publicly listed companies from 1996 to
2014). In contrast, a class action firm specializing in securities fraud litigation brings securities fraud class
actions constantly. A company with a 50% chance of winning a Rule 23(f) appeal may take the gamble. Adverse
precedent will not likely harm the company in the future, given the low likelihood that the company will be
sued again. But an adverse appellate decision for a plaintiffs’ firm negatively impacts the dozens of future
securities fraud class actions the firm plans to litigate. A significant portion of the comparatively few plaintifffiled Rule 23(f) petitions should therefore come either from plaintiffs’ lawyers with little experience litigating
class actions, or from unsophisticated plaintiffs’ lawyers.
274 E.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law,
93 TEX. L. REV. 625, 655-58 (2015); see also Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011).
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CODA?
In April 2016, the Third Circuit upheld a massive class settlement resolving
20,000 concussion-related tort claims against the National Football League,
ending Rule 23’s near-total exile from mass tort litigation.275 Amchem all but killed
the mass tort class action for nearly two decades. Whence its reincarnation?
If mass tort litigation had great significance for the class action, the class
action was never more than a “sideshow” for mass tort litigation.276 Amchem
didn’t stop litigators from making Amchem-like deals to resolve mass tort
liability. They continue to do so, just without Rule 23.277 The most notorious
example involves the so-called “all-or-nothing” settlement. Defendants offer
huge sums to settle, but they fund the deal only if a supermajority of
individual plaintiffs agree to its terms. A plaintiffs’ lawyer who stands to
receive a third of each client’s payout has an overwhelming incentive to
convince her hundreds of individually retained clients to acquiesce.
Moreover, she stops filing cases; doing so only increases the denominator and
thus makes the defendants’ threshold all the more difficult to meet.
Such settlements truly create Nagareda’s “private administrative regimes.”
Judges have no more explicit authority to intervene in what are effectively
thousands of individual contracts negotiated between defendants and
plaintiffs than they would have to scuttle a settlement in an ordinary
individual action.278 Perhaps for this reason, and perhaps because endemic
conflicts of interest give these non-class settlements such a seamy
underbelly,279 the class action holds some appeal.280 If litigators will find a
way to the same result anyway, why not bring litigation under Rule 23’s aegis
and ensure that judges have some say over what deals get struck?
This question smacks of similar logic that supported the mass tort class
action experiment in the first instance. Weinstein, Williams, and others
275 In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016); see also
Alison Frankel, In NFL Concussion Case, 3rd Circuit Reopens Door for Personal Injury Class Actions, REUTERS
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/04/19/in-nfl-concussion-case-3rd-circuitreopens-door-for-personal-injury-class-actions/ [https://perma.cc/YX52-CHWH].
276 Interview with Paul Rheingold, supra note 237, Transcript at 4.
277 Id. at 6; Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Torts—Maturation of Law and Practice, at 15-16 (Jan.
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
278 E.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389,
416-26 (2011).
279 E.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble With All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
979, 1006-22 (2010).
280 In his concurring opinion in Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., Anthony Scirica, a leading
judicial authority on aggregate litigation, compared nonclass settlements unfavorably to class action
deals because of the power judges enjoy over the latter. 667 F.3d 273, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J.,
concurring). See also Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 430 (2014) (describing courts’ differing views on the
merits of the class action mechanism).

2017]

Short Life, Long Afterlife

1597

believed that a class action could perform better than an overtaxed tort system
struggling to render equitable justice efficiently. But such utilitarianism was
insufficient in the 1990s to legitimate Rule 23’s foray into the personal injury
domain. Perhaps the move back to Rule 23 that the NFL Concussion
settlement heralds will ultimately demonstrate that the federal judiciary had
it right all along when it committed to the class action as a path out of the
asbestos morass. Or perhaps this episode will be but a coda and prove the old
saw right: those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it.
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